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IN THE SUPREME COUBT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff -Respondents, 
vs. 
JA}.IIES LOYD UNDERWOOD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This case is an appeal from a conviction in the 
District Court on the charge of driving a motor vehicle 
during the period of revocation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried de novo on appeal from City 
Court in the District Court in Weber County, Utah, on 
a stipulated set of facts and from a judgment of guilty 
the Defendant appeals. 
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RELIEJF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant seeks reversal of judgment and 
acquital of the charges of driving during revocation. 
STATE·MENT OF FAOTS 
On the 11th day of June, 1960, the Defendant was 
charged with operating a motor vehicle upon a public 
highway of the State of Utah, U -204, in Weber County, 
Utah, while his driver's license was suspended. That 
at the trial of the case, it was stipulated that Mr. Under-
wood, the Defendant, was in effect driving a motor 
vehicle at the time charged. (T-3) However, the validity 
of the revocation of the Defendant's driver's license was 
attacked at the hearing (T-3). The record indicates that 
prior to being arrested for the present alleged infrac-
tion, Mr. Underwood had a six-month suspension for 
moving violations (T-4), that six-month period of sus-
pension had completely and fully run and at the con-
clusion of the period, Mr. Underwood went to the State 
Capitol to the Drivers' License Division to secure a 
return of his license (T-5). H'e was informed by the 
Driver's License Division that they had lost his driver's 
license somewhere in the Department and it would be 
necessary to issue him a second duplicate license. ( T -5) 
In order to receive the second license, Mr. Underwood 
signed an affidavit, at the departments request, that he 
did not have the original driver's license in his pos-
session. He then received a duplicate license permitting 
him to drive on the roads of the State of Utah. Herein-
after for the purpose of clarification, the lost license will 
be referred to as the "original license" and the second 
license issued as the "duplicate license". Thereafter 
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the Defendant had a duplicate license in his possession 
and the right to drive upon the roads of the State of 
Utah. About the time the duplicate license was to expire, 
Mr. Underwood received from the State of Utah his 
original license which had the same expiration date so 
that he had two driver's licenses in his possession, both 
the original and the duplicate. (T-6) 
Thereafter, Mr. Underwood for a second time re-
ceived a second order of suspension for moving vio~ 
lations from the Drivers' License Division. At that 
time he surrendered the duplicate license to the State 
of Utah pursuant to tll.e order but did not surrender 
the original license s1nce it had expired at the time of 
the order. The Defendant then upon one occasion drove 
his motor vehicle and was picked up and ultimately 
cited for driving during revocation and at that time 
displayed to the arresting officre the original driver's 
license which was expired but which he had maintained 
in his possession. This was, however, not the instant 
charge. Upon receipt of notice by the Drivers' License 
Division that Mr. Underwood had his original driver's 
license in his possession, the State of Utah Drivers' 
License Division gave Mr. Underwood an additional 
year's revocation for making an alleged false affidavit 
that he did not have a driver's license in his possession 
at the time of receipt of the duplicate license. (T-8) 
This, in spite of the fact that it was the State of Utah 
Drivers' License Division who was responsible for the 
error and it was the same division who had actual notice 
of the fact that the affidavit was not false since the 
original driver's license was in their possession at the 
time. It was that year's revocation given to Mr. TTnder-
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wood for making a false affidavit that cause the instant 
case since :Mr. Underwood ··was driving during that 
period of revo'eaiin when ipioked ;up and charged. Mr. 
Underwood received no notice of a :right to a hearing, 
but ·was rather sent department driver's license order, 
a·copy of which 'is found in the file, at page 14. Mr. 
Underwood had further been ibefore Mr. Miller of the 
Drivers' License Division and had been advised that 
there was no reason for him .ever to return ·because it 
would do no _good (T~14) and Mr. Underwood, in reliance 
on what Mr. Miller said and on the wording of the 
order which stated as .a past fact "it is hereby ordered 
that the above described driving privilege and license 
privilege and license issued to the above named person 
be, and the .same are hereby revoked for the period of 
one "year . . . your driver's license will be held for an 
an additional year from the date -it is received in this 
d~partment.;, No notice of -any_ right to hearing was 
given, but rather Mr. Underwood was advised as a :past 
fact that his license had been revoked. 
POINT I. :THAT THE REVOCATION IN -QUES-
TION RErSULTED FROM AN E1RROR IN THE 
DRIVERS \LICENSE DIVISION OF MOTOR VE-
HICLES !DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
POIN,T II. THAT THE NOTICE AND SUSPEN-
SION, GIVEN THE DEFENDANT -BY THE DRIV-
ERS LICENSE DIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH DID NOT COMPLY -WITH FUNDA1\1ENTAL 
RULIDS OF DUE PROCESS. 
A. SAID NOTICE MISLED THE DEFENDANT 
·4 
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INTO BELIEVING THAT HE HAD NO RIGHT OF 
APPEAL. 
B. SAID NOTICEi LEFT DAY8 BLANK AND 
WAS IN EFFECT SO AMBIGUOUS TO GIVE THE 
DEFENDANT NO NOTICE OF REVOCATION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THAT THID REVOCATION IN QUES-
TION RESULTED FROM AN ERROR IN THE 
DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION OF MOTOR VE-
HICLES DELP ARTMENT OF THE 8TATE OF UTAH. 
As set out in the record, the facts suggest that 
any error in the case was the error of the State of Utah 
through the Motor Vehicle Department and not the 
error of Mr. Underwood. 
It is submitted that it is contrary to any principal 
of law and justice to punish an individual for the error 
of the government through its administrative body, 
the Drivers License Division. This was the type of 
mistake that certainly could happen to any adminis-
trative agency but it is further the typ·e of error that 
once having occured should be corrected by the Motor 
Vehicle Division and should not result in a penalty being 
imposed upon Mr. Underwood. 
The present action comes to this Court based upon 
the fact that Mr. Underwood did drive his automobile 
during the period of the erroneous suspension. He is 
now in the position that he is in jeopardy of punishment 
for violating a suspension order which, had the Driver's 
License Division been cognizant of its own acts, would 
have never been issued. 
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POINT II. THAT THE NOTICE AND S.USPEN~ 
SION GIVEN THE DEFENDANT BY THE DRI-
V·ERS LICENSE DIVISION, OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH DID NO~ COMPLY Wr.UH FUNDAMENTAL 
RULES OF DlJE PROCESS. 
A. SAID NOTICE MISLEAD THE DEFEND-
ANT INTO BELIEiVING THAT HE HAD NO RIGHT 
TO APPEAL. 
The uncontroverted record in the case indicates 
that Mr. Underwood received notice from the State of 
Utah in the form set forth in the appendix. That the 
terminology of the revocation read as follows: 
"It is hereby ordered that the above described driv-
ing privilege· and License issued to the above named 
person be, and the same are hereby revoked for a 
period of one year, beginning~-----------------------··-·----, 19 ________ , 
YOUR DRIVER'S LICENSE WIL,L BE HELD FOR 
AN ADDITIONAL ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE 
IT IS RECEVIED IN THIS DEPARTMENT." 
"It is further ordered that you, the above named 
person, shall NOT operate any motor vehicle on the 
highways of this state during the period above set forth, 
and that you forthwith surrender to this DEPART-
MENT your said license (unless heretofore surrendered) 
as in said Act provided.' 
"This cause for such action is stated as follows: 
MAKING OF A FALSE AFFIDAVIT." 
The wording of the order as set forth clearly indi-
cates that the revocation had taken place and that it 
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was a past accomplished fact and contrary to the pro-
cedure in other Departments does not advfse the De-
fendant of any right to appeal but rather clearly mis-
leads him into believing that the suspension was an 
aceomplished fact and by its wording, to the layman, 
does not appear to leave any door open for review or 
appeal. 
The Law throughout the United States clearly indi-
cates that revocation by orders of this type must comply 
with fundamental rules of due process in legal pro-
ceedings. As late as 1959 this Court in the case of 
11/c.Anerney v. State, 341 P(2) 212 Utah: 1959 has made 
the following pronouncement: 
"For the guidance of the department of public 
safety, we observe that if there is a request by 
a suspended driver, he should have the privilege 
of having witnesses subpoenaed in his own be-
half. The department, in conducting its hear-
ings, should substantially comply with the funda-
mental rules of due process in legal proceedings, 
even though all of the particular formalities re-
quired in Court proceedings need not be met. 
Though the applicant contends that in the 
hearing before the department, he was denied due 
process of law, we are of the opinion that the 
provisions of the law are reasonable regulations 
in the safeguarding of lives and property upon 
the highway, even though a driver may have his 
license suspended pending the hearing. The 
right to hearing before the department and its 
determination being subject to re-examination 
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in the Court is sufficient to protect the substantial 
rights of the driver." 
There are numerous cases in which the rights to 
a driver's license are discussed. Among those are the 
following, to-wit: 
Schutt v. Macduff 
127 N.Y.S. 2d 116 N.Y. 1954. 
"A license to operate an automobile is not 
a gift or favor from a sovereign but it is a thing 
of real value which may not be revoked arbi-
trarily and taken away capriciously. One po-
ssessing a driver's license and having the proper 
ability and qualifications to drive an automobile 
may not be deprived of his license without oppor-
tunity to be heard upon all possible issues of 
law and fact. The statute declaring that a motor 
vehicle operator is deemed to have consented in 
advance to blood and chemical tests for the pur-
pose of determining alcoholic content of his blood, 
if test is administered at direction of police offi-
cer having reasonable ground to suspect such 
operator of driving in an intoxicated condition, 
and subjecting person to revocation of his license 
upon a refusal to submit to tests is unconstitu-
tional as denial of due process in absence of the 
inclusion of a provision limiting its application 
to the case where there has been a lawful arrest 
and provision entitling the licensee to an ulti-
mate hearing upon adequate record before the 
final revocation of the license." 
The Application of Goodwin 
17 N.Y.S. 2d 426 N.Y. 1940. 
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"One to whom the motor vehicle ·bureau 
issues a ·license to drive :an automobile has a 
.vested right therein which .cannot . be :taken from 
him capriciously or arbitrarily. In .a proceeding 
to revoke an automobile driver's license, a com-
missioner of motor vehicles has quasi judicial 
functions, which he must exercise in a legal man-
ner, one whose·automobile;licen£e is·-sought to be 
revoked· on another ground than, his, conviction of 
a crime has the right to be,confronted with wit-
nesses and given1the· opportunity-to cross-examine 
his accusers at' a hearing: before the 1 commissioner 
of motors. Failure. to give. the accused 'an oppor-
tunity to be heard in his· own defense and to cross-
. examine .his .accusers violates. a basic right ac-
corded to every .citizen. under .our .constitution." 
Fake v. Macduff 
116 N.Y.S. 2a 597. 
"This .is a .proceeding for. the .revocation of 
a motor vehicle operator's license wherein the 
driver sought an order directing the commis-
sioner of motor vehicles to show caus·e why an 
order should not !be ·made comma:nding him to 
annul and cancel his order. suspending petitoner's 
operator's license. 
·'The petitioner was entitled ~to .a ·judicial 
hearing ·and not a m.ere ;inquisition~' " 
"As. stated· by Justice Heffernan, written for 
the Court in Sheridan v. Fletcher, supra: 
'A ·licensee to operate a motor vehicle is a 
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valuable one; it is a right of which no citizen 
should be deprived except on clear and convinc-
ing proof warranting such drastic action.' " 
"As stated by Justice Cohan, writing for the 
Court in Kafka v. Fletcher, supra (272 APP 364, 
71, N.Y.S. 182)". 
'We also desire to call attention to the fact 
that in a proceeding such as this where revocation 
or suspension of a license is permissive, the 
statute requires that the holder of the license shall 
have the opportunity to be heard except where 
such revocation or suspension is based solely on 
a Court conviction.' " 
*** Good cause must be shown to warrant 
revocation or suspension of a license, based upon 
competent, legal testimony. At such hearing 
petitioner has the right to be confrontde by the 
witnesses who testified against him and he should 
be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine his 
accusers.'" 
N.Y. 1952 
Ratliff v. Lampton et al 
195 P 2d 792 Calif. 1948 
"The question is whether the department was 
authorized to revoke the license without giving 
plaintiff an opportunity to be heard. The answer 
is to be found in the pertinent provisions of the 
Vehicle Code as amended in 1945 which were in 
force and effect when the order was issued. 
"We are not concerned with those provisions 
10 
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which make it mandatory upon the department 
to revoke or suspend the privilege of any person 
to operate a motor vehicle upon the highway 
upon receipt of a record showing that he has 
been convicted of certain specified offenses. V e-
hicle Code, Section 304, 307, 315, Sub. A 3. In 
such cases the facts have already been deter-
mined in a criminal proceeding. A different 
situation is present, however, where, as here, the 
department just makes an independent determin-
ation of facts as a basis for its actions, and this 
was recognized by the legislature in the detailed, 
albeit somewhat confusing, provision of the 1954 
Code relative to investigation, re-examination, 
hearing and review. Section 315 provided that 
a person was entitled to demand a hearing be-
fore the director within 60 days after notice of 
suspension or revocation by the department. The 
hearing might be held before the director or rep-
resentatives appointed by him and was to be con-
ducted as near as practicable according to the 
rules of procedure governing civil actions. It 
was further provided that an application for a 
hearing should not operate to stay any action of 
the department. . . 
'There was no express provision in the Code 
which authorized the department to revoke plain-
tiff's license without first giving him an oppor-
tunity to be heard, and where, as here, a license 
can be revoked only for good cause, this require-
ment carries with it the right to notice and hear-
ing as a condition to revocation unless there is 
11 
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a clear showing of legislative intent to dispense 
with that right.' 
... The fact that the Vehicle Code provided 
for a revocation subsequent to the review does not 
alter this rule. We should not imply llegislative 
intent to deprive a person of this license with-
out the prior opportunity to be heard unless 
compelled to do so by the plain language of the 
statute, regardless of whether there is a right 
to an administrative review after revocation." 
POINT II. B. SAID NOTICE LEFT DAYS 
BLANK AND WAS IN EFFECT SO AMBIGUOUS 
TO GIVE DEFENDANT NO NOTICE OF REVO-
CATION. 
It is further respectfully submitted that the revo-
cation order is ambiguous in that: (1) It states no 
definite period of suspension but rather leaves the be-
ginning date blank. (2) That it indicates the time to 
commence the year of revocation from the date the 
license was received by the Department of Motor Ve-
hicles, while the license had long before expired and 
was not in effect, a valid drivers license under any 
stretch of the imagination. It is submitted that any 
suspension time should run from the time the license 
expired rather than from the time it was surrendered 
to the Department since in force and effect it was a 
useless piece of paper having long since expired. 
It is therefore submitted that by reason of its am-
biguous and, too, by reason of the date the suspension 
was to start that the order itself should not be entitled 
to the force and effect of law. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the tenor- of this notice entitled 
Order gave the defendant no notice of his right to 
appeal and rather couched as it was in terminology of 
the present ten·se, tended to mislead the defendant into 
believing that he had no right of appeal. In light of 
the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the first 
cited case above, that fundamental rules of due process 
should apply to this type- he-aring, it is submitted that 
rathe:r; than due process, the Order itself suggests and 
presents a misleading infe:r;ance that the defendant 
had no righ to appeal. The Order itself, it is sub-
mitted was vague and ambiguo1iJ.,s in that it indicates a 
revocation for a period of one year and has no begin-
ning date that the- revocation is to run.. 
The ab0ve facts, coupled with the fact as stipulated 
in the hearing before this Court that the defendant had 
a meritorious defense to the action and who, as a mat-
ter of fact, rather than making a false affidavit, had 
made a true affidavit and any errors committed in the 
subject case were the errors of the State of Utah 
through the Driver's License Division who is the moving 
party in the matter. 
It is submitted to the Court in conclusion that the 
defendant was denied due process in the revocation of 
his driver's license in that he was substantially misled 
into believing that he had no right to appeal based upon 
the wording of the suspension Order itself and the ad-
vise given him by Mr. Miller that under no circumstances 
or event was he to return to his office. If, in fact, the 
purpose of the criminal law is to deter future mis-
13 
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conduct, then in fact, there is no purpose in proceeding 
against a man in compliance with the Motor Vehicle 
Code, when, as a matter of fact, the general offense 
the man is charged with is based upon a mistaken order 
out of the Driver's License Division and further the 
mistaken order was based upon the acts of the Division 
itself and not upon any misconduct of the defendant, 
James Loyd Underwood. 
It is respectfully sumbitted that for the reasons 
set forth in this Brief, the present case charging the 
defendant, James Loyd Underwood, with driving during 
revocation, should be found in Mr. Underwood's favor 
and a verdict of Not Guilty rendered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. PATTERSON AND 
ROBERT V. PHILLIPS, 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
and Defendant 
14 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 
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